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1. INTRODUCTION

It is part of the ritual of the American law school. A new crop of incoming students arrives, and the dean is called upon to give the welcoming

speech. This welcoming speech includes the familiar paeans to justice and to
the role of lawyers in protecting the rights of the downtrodden; it recalls famous

events and epic figures in the glorious history of law and lawyers; and it reminds
the new law students that, unlike the carefree experience of their undergraduate
years, law school will be very hard work. But then the dean shifts course, and
foreshadows what the students will actually be learning during their three years
Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University. This Article is the written version of the Donley Memorial Lectures, presented at the West Virginia University College of Law on November 15-16, 2000. A version of
this lecture and article appears as Chapter 10 of Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and
Stereotypes (Harvard University Press, 2003). I am grateful to the College of Law not only for
giving me the privilege of joining the illustrious group of scholars who have delivered previous
Donley Lectures, and not only for the stimulation provided by the questioners on the occasion of
delivering the Lectures, but most of all for having introduced me, as a beginning Assistant Professor a quarter of a century ago, to the joys of a life of teaching, scholarship, and intellectual collegiality.
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in law school. Law school is not about learning a battery of legal rules, the dean
cautions, thereby attempting to alleviate the expected anxieties of first year students who, come November, become increasingly anxious about that fact, in all
of their courses combined, and for all of their ability to make articulate assertions about policyI they have yet to learn a single legal rule. Nor is law school
about learning where to stand in the courtroom or about how to write a will or a
complaint, the dean continues, hoping to inoculate the school and its administration from the complaints of students who worry that law school is insufficiently
practical. Rather, the dean pompously concludes, law school is at its core about
learning how to think like a lawyer, and about mastering the skill that is commonly referred to as legal reasoning. By learning to think like lawyers, the dean
assures the students, they will not only be better lawyers, but will also be better
at a host of other occupations that attract those who have had the benefit of a
legal education.
In holding out the promise that the students will learn how to think like
lawyers, the dean reinforces the view that legal reasoning is a concrete and
learnable skill, sort of like long division, French, or statistics. And like the master of any of these skills, the dean pronounces, the master of legal reasoning, the
person who knows how to think like a lawyer, has something that distinguishes
those who possess the skill from everyone else, the everyone else usually identified by that wonderful catchall term, "non-lawyer."
In the hands of the skillful practitioner of the ancient art of decanal oratory, the opening day's speech serves its intended goal. Students commence
their studies with a sense of purpose and mission, confident that at the end of it
all they will have a discrete, important, and, above all, marketable skill. But just
what is that skill? What can lawyers do that other sorts of folks cannot? My
goal here is to tackle at least one facet of that question, and in the process to
attempt to locate in the distinction between the general and the particular the
point of view that may provide a partial explanation of how, if at all, the kind of
thinking that goes on in the legal system differs from the kind of thinking that
pervades ordinary life.

II. THE APPARENT PARTICULARITY OF LAW
There are many ways in which one could approach the topic of thinking
like a lawyer, but one that appeals to me, and one that seems especially timely at
this point in the history of American legal thought, is along the dimension of
generality and particularity,for it is along this dimension that many of the debates about the nature of legal reasoning can be situated. So let us start with a
conception of decision-making, and not just legal decision-making, that puts at
one end of a continuum the maximally particular. Every conceivable feature of
an event, or of a decision-making opportunity, is relevant to the decision, and no
In deference to the sensibilities of my current colleagues in a school of public policy, I will
not refer to the standard policy claims that dominate law school classrooms as "arguments."
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feature should be excluded from consideration. If a police officer stops a driver
for unsafe driving, 2 the particularistic police officer making a particularistic
decision whether to summon the driver to appear in court would take into account the condition of the roads, the amount of traffic, the weather, the time of
day, the type and condition of the car, the experience and previous driving record of the driver, the explanation offered by the driver, and perhaps even the
ability of the driver to pay the fine. At its extreme, particularism is about taking
everything into account.
By contrast, a more general decision-making style would not focus so
closely on particular drivers driving particular cars under particular circumstances, but would rather have made the decision in advance about an entire
category - all drivers driving all cars under all conditions on a moderately large
stretch of the highway. 3 Whatever real differences might exist among actual
drivers, actual cars, actual conditions, and actual locations would be suppressed
in the service of making decisions based on large categories rather than on exceedingly narrow and situation-specific facts.
This distinction between general and particular decision-making exists
in numerous domains.
The traditional debates between act- and ruleutilitarianism, for example, are debates that take the same form. 4 The actutilitarian, while still employing various heuristic presumptions and rules of
thumb, maintains that the goal of each decision is to maximize utility. Accordingly, every fact is relevant if it contributes positively or negatively to the assessment of the utility of the outcome of the decision, and for the act-utilitarian
the best thing to do on this occasion is the thing that will maximize utility. By
contrast, the rule utilitarian acts and thinks differently.5 From the perspective of
the addressee of a rule, the rule-utilitarian faithfully follows the rule whose
faithful observance will maximize utility over a range of decisions or acts, and
does not inquire whether it would be wise to deviate from the rule on this occa2

1

deliberately do not say "running a stop sign," or "exceeding the speed limit."

A speed

limit, for example, like any other rule, represents a departure from maximal particularity. Under a
speed limit, even one that is presumptive rather than absolute, a driver traveling at a speed in
excess of, say, fifty-five miles per hour is at least partially precluded from relying on facts that a
more open-ended style of decision-making would take as relevant. See generally FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-

On thinking about rule and standards, and thus generality and particularity, from the perspective of whether decisions are or are not made in advance of the circumstances of application,
see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
The other locus classicus in thinking about rules and standards is Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
3

Much of the debate took place in the 1950s and 1960s, and most of the landmarks are collected in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968) and MILL'S
UTILITARIANISM: CRITICAL ESSAYS (David Lyons ed., 1997).
4

5

See RICHARD BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY:

THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL

ETHICS (1959); Larry Alexander, Pursuingthe Good - Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985).
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sion. 6 And from the perspective of the creator of the rule, who in order to make
the distinction between act- and rule-utilitarianism must be conceptually or actually distinct from the addressee of the rule, 7 the rule-utilitarian makes the rule
whose faithful observance by others will maximize its utility, rather than telling
those others to just maximize utility as they see fit for each act or for each decision.
That the rule-utilitarian is unwilling to repose the power to make primary utility calculations to each decision-maker signals a connection with another area in which the distinction between general and particular decisionmaking is highly relevant. When in numerous domains we applaud the exercise
of discretion and create the conditions for its exercise, 8 we are in effect encouraging particularistic decision-making, for we are fostering an environment in
which decision-makers are free to look at every dimension of the particular decision before them, and to make the decision that, in that context,9 appears at
that time to be optimal. And when we are as institutional designers fearful of
this kind of discretion, we substitute rules, or regimens, or protocols, each designed to constrain discretion, and each designed to set out what is to be done in
advance of the particular occasion on which it must be decided what is to be
l
done. 1
Although the rule of law is typically contrasted with the "rule of men
[sic]," 11 numerous features of modem and not so modem legal thought encourage the view that legal decision is ultimately, and at its best, particularistic.
Although Aristotle had contrasted law with equity, 12 and the suboptimal gener6

See generally CONRAD D. JOHNSON, MORAL LEGISLATION: A LEGAL-POLITICAL MODEL FOR

INDIRECT CONSEQUENTIALIST REASONING (1991).

7

On the distinction between rule-maker and rule-follower being essential for an intelligible
version of rule-utilitarianism, see R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND
POINT (1981); SCHAUER, supra note 2.
8
See generally Colin Driver, The Optimal PrecisionofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65
(1983); Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982);
Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 511 (1991); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986), Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-12 (1992); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage,
92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983); Suzanna Sherry, The Gender ofJudges, 4 LAW & INEQ. 159 (1986).
9
10

See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).
See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Eco-

nomic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (1991); Kaplow, supranote 3; Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
"1
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (citation omitted); Stephen J. Burton, Particularism,Discretion, and
the Rule of Law in THE RULE OF LAW: NoMos XXXVI 178 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
12
THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS § 1137a-b (J.A.K. Thomson trans.,

1977).

For explication, see GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS,
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ality of law with the optimizing potential of equity, the notion that equity was
something done outside the legal system has not survived. Instead equity itself
has been assimilated within the legal system. This assimilation has made equity
more rule-bound, 13 but the discretion, flexibility, and situation-specific judgequity is now understood to exist as part of the law and
ment that characterizes
14
not outside of it.

But although the system of equity has become part of the legal system,
the equitization of the law has in fact been far more pervasive, especially in the
United States. 15 If we understand equity less as a formal system and more in
Aristotelian terms as the ability to reach the correct result in the particular case

without reference to the constraining generality of rules, we see in the United
States an increasing acceptance of the power of judges and other legal actors to
use whatever devices are necessary to reach the right result in the particular

case. Most obvious, of course, is the frequency with which express constitutional or statutory language necessitates the kind of open-ended inquiry that
characterizes particularistic decision-making. In the context of the constitution

we see provisions like "Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
18

17
unreasonable searches and seizures,"
States," 16 necessary and proper,"
9
"cruel and unusual punishments,"' "equal protection of the laws," 20 and "due
process of law.'21 When we turn from the constitution to statutes, similarly nonconstraining language arises in the context of the Sherman Antitrust Act's pro-

hibition on "[e]very contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade

EXACTNESS OF ETHICS 362-82 (1994); BERNARD YACK, THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL:
COMMUNITY, JUSTICE, AND CONFLICT IN ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 193-94 (1993).
Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI
13
120, 123 (lan Shapiro ed., 1994).
"The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
14
mould [sic] each decree to the necessities of the particular case." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 329 (1944) (Douglas, J.).
15
See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277. Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to claim
that "[t]he principles of justice require judges to consider each case independently." Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern ofLegal Change in a Common
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 629 (2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16
17
18

Id. art. t, § 8, cl.18.
Id.amend. IV.

19

Id. amend. VIII.

20

Id. amend. XIV, § 1.

21

Id amends. V & XIV, § 1.
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or commerce ... ,"22 the Securities and Exchange Act's condemnation of "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," 23 the way in which the Americans with
Disabilities Act does not require accommodations to the disabled when such an
accommodation would "fundamentally alter the nature"' 24 of the enterprise, and
the widespread acceptance, usually enshrined in statutes but sometimes only in
judicial practice, of the "best interests of
the child" standard for determining
25
custody and related child welfare matters.
It is a noteworthy feature of American law, however, that contextual
and particularistic decision-making is not restricted to such express statutory or
constitutional mandates to engage in open-ended adjudication. When precise
and clear statutes or constitutional provisions on their face appear to dictate a
sub-optimal outcome, judges are encouraged, or at the very least authorized, to
use a variety of devices to reach the right result instead of the statute-indicated
result. 26 These devices would include recourse to a number of canons of statutory interpretation allowing interpreters, when necessary, to avoid the literal
meaning of the statutory language by looking instead to legislative intent, to
statutory purpose,27 to the place of the particular provision in a larger regulatory
or legal scheme, 28 or simply to the necessity of avoiding an absurd result.29 In
the academic literature, increasingly descriptive of judicial practice, we see calls
to judges to engage in "dynamic" statutory interpretation, to reach the result
that would involve the best public policy, to interpret a statute as if one were
interpreting a work of literature, to decide only one case at a time, 32 and,34if
33
necessary, simply to update a statute that the judge perceives to be obsolete.
22

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).

23

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2004).

24

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2004), famously interpreted in PGA Tour, Inc. v. [Casey]

Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
25
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 359-78

(1996).
See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949) (using functional rather than literal
meaning of "officer" and "director" in interpreting those words in § 16(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934); Selas Corp. of Am. v. Voogd, 365 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1973
(same). See generally Thomas L. Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 54 N.C. L. REv. 1(1975).
27
See, most famously, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
26

See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934) (interpreting the word
"another" in Eleventh Amendment to include "the same"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13
(1890) (same).
29
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
28

REv. 405 (1989).
30

See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).

31

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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Although these perspectives and devices appear on their face to be different from each other, all share the common goal of empowering judges to
reach the correct result in the particular case. When judges follow the literal
words of a statute and in doing so come to what appears to be an inferior outcome, their decisions are condemned as mechanistic or formalistic, but the
charge of formalism is of a piece with a dominant strain in modem American
legal thought. 35 Whether it be the focus on the particular urged and described
by Legal Realists such as Jerome Frank 36 and Karl Llewellyn, 37 the emphasis on
implementing in every case the real purpose of a law that was the characteristic
of Lon Fuller 38 and the Legal Process school of thought, 39 or Ronald Dworkin's
distinction between the superficial words of a statute and the "real" statute that
reflected the full scope of a society's legal commitments, 40 the overwhelming
theme of American legal thought and of American adjudication has been pressure against the constraints of general rules and sympathy with the equitable
idea, in the Aristotelian sense, of finding a way to remedy
the defects that are
41
frequently occasioned by the generality of legal rules.
On the basis of all of this, it would be tempting to conclude that the essence of law is its particularity. The job of a judge, it might be thought, is above
all to be right, to make the best decision possible in this case. King Solomon,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:

32

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT

(1999); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733
(1995).
33

See generally T. Alexander Alieinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.

REV. 20 (1988).
34

See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); see
also Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist

Role of the Courts in FederalBanking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987); Note, Intent,
Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).
35

I describe the phenomenon of formalism as epithet and attempt to rescue formalism from
some of this condemnation in Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
36
See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
38
See generally Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71
37

HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958); see also Robert S. Summers, ProfessorFuller's Jurisprudence and
America's DominantPhilosophyof Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433 (1978).
39

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:

BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, eds., 1994).
40

DWORKIN, supra note 3 1, at 15-40.

41

See generally Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REv. 847

(1987).
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after all, if often thought of as the quintessential judge, but Solomonic wisdom
is not understood to be a function of obeying rules, following precedent, or fitting the dilemma of contested parentage of the baby into a pre-existing general
category of cases of this type. Rather, Solomon is revered for having come up
with the perfect solution to this case as he then perceived it personally and
closely. If Solomon is law at its purest, then law at its purest is consummately
particular.
III. Is LAW ABOUT JUDGING?
But is King Solomon law at its purest? In order to answer that question,
we need to divide it into two categories. First, is Solomonic judging to be understood as judging at its purest? And, second, is judging, whether by King
Solomon, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Judge Judy, or anyone else, to be understood
as law at its purest?
For reasons that will become apparent presently, I want to take up the
second question first, and thus to consider the implications of looking at the
judge as the central legal player and thus to judging as central to law. Certainly
the judge-focused view of law is, at least in the United States, omnipresent.
Law students spend most of their time reading opinions written by judges and
devote their classroom hours to struggling with whether the judge reached the
correct result and justified that result in an appropriate way. Law professors
write articles that, typically, criticize judicial opinions, and offer the analysis
that the article's author would have given had she been a member of the relevant
court and had been assured that he or she had been writing a compliant majority.
Even that portion of the practicing bar that specializes in litigation is preoccupied with the identity, the competence, and the social, political, moral, and
jurisprudential proclivities of the judge before whom they argue.
Yet although judges are everywhere in American law, in American legal
scholarship,42 and in American legal education, judges occupy but a small comer
of the law.
Judges are relatively invisible for much of regulatory law and almost all of transactional law. And although it is true that much of this practice
takes place in the "shadow" of judging, 43 more often transactions are arranged
and legal advice given on the basis of statutes, rules, regulations, and regulatory
practices than on the basis of what judges are likely to do on the remote chance
that the transaction actually winds up in the hands of a judge.
The most significant problem with a judge-focused view of the law,
however, is not that judging occupies only a small portion of the phenomenon of
law. More serious is the fact that the small portion of the law that judging does
occupy is a dramatically skewed sample of the full universe of legal events.
42

See Frederick Schauer, Judgingin a Cornerof the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717 (1988).

43

See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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From Karl Llewellyn 44 to Richard Posner 4 5 to George Priest and William
Klein, 46 those who are sensitive to the dynamics and incentives of dispute resolution have recognized that few legal events and few legal disputes wind up in
court. Rather, only those disputes in which two opposed parties holding mutually exclusive positions each believe that they have an appreciable chance of
prevailing are likely candidates for litigation. As a result, the universe of litigated cases, unlike the universe of legal events and even unlike the universe of
filed cases, consists disproportionately of those disputes in which the law is sufficiently uncertain that both of the parties holding mutually exclusive positions
believe that they might actually prevail, even though only one of them actually
will. And of course the same phenomenon exists even more so on appeal, since
from the set of all decided cases the only ones that are likely candidates for appeals pursued through judgment and opinion (when an opinion is actually issued) are those in which, again, both sides, even after judgment, believe that
they might win, even though only one will. And at the pinnacle of the system,
the eighty-five or so cases a year that the Supreme Court decides on the merits
4
with full opinion from the more than seven thousand they are asked to decide, 7
it is no surprise to discover that almost none of those cases are easy, and that
in all of them the law was essentially in equipoise prior to the Court's decision,
either because, rarely, there was virtually no law, or because, much more commonly, the law that was available in the form of statutes, cases, regulations, and
reported judicial opinions was such that the law could plausibly - professionally
49
respectably - have supported a victory for either of the opposing parties.
What it suggests, of course, is that King Solomon himself existed at the
edges and not at the center of the law. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the tale of Solomon is that it arose in the context of such an unusual
event. Although adjudication became necessary when it turned out that two
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930). See also
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 6, 64-68 (1960). For
commentary, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
44

45

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (3d ed. 1986).

46

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL

STUD. 1 (1984); George Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1980). See also Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Casesfor Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
185 (1985).
In the 2000 term, the Supreme Court decided 86 cases with full opinion, and was asked to
decide 7713. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REv. 539, 546 (2001).

47

48

See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).

This is the central lesson of Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950). Llewellyn focused only on the canons of statutory construction, but his lesson about the
common availability of canonical or authoritative legal to support both of two mutually exclusive
positions in a lawsuit applies much more broadly.
49
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different women both claimed motherhood of the same child, it is noteworthy
that neither King Solomon nor any other judge was likely called upon to decide
those cases in which a childless woman desired another woman's child because
the childless woman thought she would be a better mother, or desired a child
more than did some child's natural mother. The decision by Solomon was indeed an act of law, but so was the prevailing practice in which the overwhelming majority of natural mothers were allowed to keep their children even when
others desired them or could better care for them. Similarly, although judges are
called upon to decide cases in which question about times and dates are contested for various unusual reasons, 50 law is no less present when judges are not
called upon to decide those cases in which a legally enforceable deadline or time
limit is contained in a statute, regulation, or other legal instrument.
There is, then, a more than plausible argument to be made that focusing
on judging is a misguided method for identifying the nature, essence, or character of the phenomenon that is law. But even if my claim is mistaken, and judging is indeed law at its purest, it does not follow that Solomonic judging is law
at its purest. Solomon, of course, was forced into making the decision he did
because there was no law for him to interpret, at least on the very matter at issue. There might have been, but was not, a statute providing that in cases of
disputed parentage the decision should be in favor of the older, or the younger,
or the richer, or the poorer, or the higher-classed, or the lower-classed, or the
married, or the single, or even the one who was better able to persuade a jury of
twelve by a preponderance of the evidence that she was in fact the biological
mother. Yet none of these tie-breaking or dispute-resolving statutes or rules
existed, and thus Solomon was forced not to apply law but to make it, and
Solomonic judging might best be understood as an example of the fact that
when there is no law it is incumbent upon the judge to make some.
When there is law, however, the situation is most often quite different.
Although commonly in the United States and occasionally in other countries we
praise the judges who ignore or bend the law in order to do the right thing, 51 the
experience of most judges is not one of pushing, bending, or breaking the law.
Rather, the experience of most judges is of following the law. Although the
New York Court of Appeals achieved jurisprudential immortality - with the
help of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, 52 and then of Ronald Dworkin - by deS0

See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (statute mistakenly set the deadline as

"prior to December 31" even though it was obvious that the intention was to make the deadline
"on or prior to December 31").

For a cross-cultural comparison on this point, see P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING,
LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
51

52

HENRY M HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
53

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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ciding in Riggs v. Palmer 54 that a grandson who murdered his grandfather in
order to accelerate his inheritance could not claim under the will regardless of
what the Statute of Wills then provided, it turns out that almost all of the courts
deciding similar cases at the time held in favor of and not against unworthy
beneficiaries. 55 That the vast majority of federal appellate cases are now decided without an opinion that the deciding court deems necessary for publication 56 again offers strong support for the proposition that a significant dimension
of judging is following the law even when politics, morality, or sympathy would

militate otherwise. Even if law is about judging, therefore, it is far from clear
that judging is about deciding cases in which there is no law, as with 57Solomon,
Palmer.
or deciding cases against and in spite of the law, as in Riggs v.
IV. THE GENERALITY OF LAW

Exposing the epiphenomenal dimensions of Solomonic wisdom enables
us to see the particularity of law in its proper light. Imagining that law is particular turns out to be a function of understanding law as judging, and of under-

standing judging of a certain kind--deciding hard cases with little legal guidance from authoritative legal sources-as a higher form of law than judging of
another kind--deciding cases in which authoritative legal materials focus the
inquiry and often strongly indicate the outcome. When Justice Thurgood Marshall is scorned for concluding with six of his brethren in United States v.
Locke 58 that "prior to December 31" means prior to December 31, an obvious
congressional scrivener's error notwithstanding, he is scorned for adopting a
54

22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).

55
Some of whom had murdered the testators, Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 106 N.E. 785 (111.1914);
Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888); Shellengerger v. Ransom, 59 N.W. 935 (Neb. 1894); In
re Carpenter's Estate, 32 A. 637 (Pa. 1895), and some of whom had not. Graham v. Burch, 55
N.W. 64 (Minn. 1893); In re Evans' Will, 98 N.Y. Supp. 1042 (App. Div. 1906); In re Wolf, 150
N.Y. Supp. 738 (Surf. Ct. 1914).
56
The practice, however, remains controversial. See, most notably, Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (unconstitutional to prohibit citation to unpublished opinions). See also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 155 (9th
Cir. 2001) (continuing prohibition on unpublished opinions); McGuinness v. Pepe, 150 F. Supp.
2d 227 (D. Mass. 2001) (questioning prohibition on citation to unpublished opinions). For the
views of the main combatants in the debate, compare Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions:
A Comment, 1 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 219 (1999), with Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt,
Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow Citations to Unpublished Dispositions, 20 CAL.
LAW. 43 (2000). For an especially perceptive analysis of the issues, see Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent.Anastasoff: Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedentin an Interpretive
Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399 (2002).
57
See generally Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of
Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 231 (even in the Supreme Court most statutory interpretation
cases are decided by looking to plain meaning of statutory text).
58

471 U.S. 84 (1985).
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59
view of judging that is routinely castigated as formalistic and mechanistic.
Yet the very question of whether Justice Marshall was faithful to or departed
from an understanding of legal reasoning or thinking like a lawyer is exactly the
matter at issue, and as a consequence it is question-begging in the extreme to
less law-like just because it was
announce that Justice Marshall's decision was
6
less particularistic, as it most assuredly was. 0
Indeed, if we are engaged in a determination of what legal reasoning is,
what thinking like a lawyer is rather than what it should be, the inquiry would
more plausibly be empirical than normative. And although there is room in
jurisprudential thought for Max Weber's notion of an ideal type - the 1999
Yankees as embodying baseball more than a pick-up game using jackets for
bases and a ball patched together with black electrical tape, even though the
latter empirically dominates the former 6' - the claim of thinking like a lawyer
cannot avoid having an inescapable empirical dimension. Just what is it that
lawyers actually do that distinguishes them from other people and from other
professionals?
When we formulate the question in this way, we see, initially, that what
is supposedly so wonderful about particularistic lawyers and judges is no less
wonderful when it appears in physicians, psychologists, detectives, social workers, architects, and teachers. In all of these professions we laud, and properly
so, the exercise of particularistic judgment. Physicians are expected to find the
right diagnosis and treatment for this patient, just as psychologists are expected
to do the same with their patients; detectives are expected to solve this crime;
social workers are expected to be able to manage this social situation; architects
are expected to produce unique buildings; and teachers are expected to understand the educational needs of individual students. We can and do praise lawyers and judges when they make the right argument for this particular situation
and reach the right decision in this particular case, but it turns out that such
praise gets us nowhere in identifying those characteristics - if any - that distinguish legal reasoning from any other sort of reasoning. Lawyers and judges,
after all, are praised not only when they are particularistic, but also when they
are compassionate, empathetic, eloquent, intelligent, trustworthy, loyal, helpful,
friendly, and brave, but no one would suggest that any of these traits, however
admirable they are and however important it is that lawyers possess them, captures the idea of legal reasoning or thinking like a lawyer, and that is because no

59

Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation, 76
VA. L. REv. 1295, 1314-16 (1990).
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoffand Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REv. 715 (1992).
61
Younger readers will probably not even recognize the activity described in the text. Too
60

bad for them.
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one would suggest that these traits, praiseworthy as they are when they appear in
lawyers, are in any way unique to or even disproportionately represented in lawyers or in what lawyers do.
Things become quite different, however, when we look not a particularity but at generality. For when we focus on generality, and look at those aspects
of legal decision-making that embody generality rather than particularity, it
turns out that some of the characteristic devices of legal argument and legal
thinking appear to be less present and less praiseworthy in other domains than
they are in law. And even if it is too strong a claim to make that legal reasoning
consists of those methods of thinking that are all of law and none of anything
else, it would be a plausible argument that we have identified the core of what it
is to think like a lawyer if we were to identify those forms of decision-making
and those forms of reasoning, if there are any, that loom much larger in law than
they do in other domains.
• . •
62
What makes a
Consider first the idea of rule-based decision-making.
rule a rule is its generality, and it is a defining feature of rules that they collect
numerous relevantly different events and treat them the same way. "Speed Limit
55" applies to a large array of drivers, cars, and driving conditions, and treats
them all in the same way. Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 penalized all those who sell and buy or buy and sell within a six month
period if they are officers, directors, or holders of more than ten percent of the
stock of a registered company regardless of whether or not they have traded on
the basis of inside information, and penalizes none of those who fall outside of
these designated categories and boundaries regardless of how much inside information they used when they traded. 63 The First Amendment 64 protects much
unworthy "speech ' 65 and little worthy "non-speech," just as the Seventh
Amendment 66 grants the right to a jury trial to all of those whose claims at law
exceed the twenty dollar limit and none of those whose claims fall below it. In
all of these instances and millions more, it is in the very nature of a rule that the
rule gathers together arguably dissimilar particulars and subjects them to similar
62

Something I have considered at great length elsewhere. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING By

THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN
LIFE (1991); Frederick Schauer, "The Convergence of Rules and Standards," Regulatory Policy
Program Working Paper RPP-2001-7, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
63
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2004).

64
65

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
For a small sample of the First Amendment's protection of speakers and speeches that a

totally particularistic decision-making approach might not protect, see United States v. Playboy

Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
66

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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treatment. Aristotle might well have said that like cases should be treated alike
and unlike cases unalike, 67 but it is the defining feature of a rule that it frequently treats like cases unalike and even more frequently treats unalike cases
alike.
At the core of the idea of a rule, therefore, is the idea of generality. 68 A
rule prohibiting
pit bulls generalizes7 about pit bulls and bans even the docile
69
ones. A mandatory retirement rule generalizes about the correlation between

age and characteristics such as decreased night vision, speed of reflexes, and
declining hearing acuity, and thus treats keen-seeing senior citizens in the same
way it treats those whose vision is declining. And, as the old jurisprudential

chestnut informs us, a rule prohibiting vehicles in the park excludes not only
those vehicles that are71 noisy and dangerous, but those vehicles that create no

problems whatsoever.
The generality that is characteristic of rules exists in other areas of law

as well. The idea of precedent mandates that we decide today's case in the same
way as we decided yesterday's, even if today's case is relevantly different from
yesterday's case, 72 and even if we think that yesterday's case was decided
wrongly. 73 Decision-making according to precedent requires a decision-maker
to group together at least two cases that look to that decision-maker to be rele-

vantly different. Even more importantly, the determination of which case is a
precedent for which other case (a case involving a red car is rarely a precedent
for a case involving a red house, at least not because of their shared redness, but
a case involving a red car will often be a precedent for a case involving a blue
car just because of their shared car-ness) involved determining which category 67

THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICs, Book V, 1131 a25 (J.A.K. Thomson

trans., 1977). For analysis, see Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1974).
68

See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U.

PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994).
Among manyexamples, see Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance 43-1987 (Jan. 28, 1987), codified
in Cincinnati, Ohio, Municipal Code § 701-24 (1987).
70
As, for example, the still-existing Age Sixty Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (2004), pursuant
69

to which the Federal Aviation Administration Authority prohibits commercial airline pilots from
flying after they reach age sixty.
71
See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law -A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 663-64 (1957).
72
See generally Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
See generally RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (1977); PRECEDENT IN LAW
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation,Precedent and the
Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1987); Gerald J. Postema, On the Moral Presence
of Our Past, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1153 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571
(1987).
73
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which generalization - includes both the precedent case and the instant case.
Consequently, by insisting that the very existence of a previous decision is a
reason for following it, the concept of precedent forces legal decision-makers to
engage not in an act of particularization, but in an act of generalizing, an act of
constructing (or following) the category that includes not just this case,74but this
case, the previous case, and possibly a whole raft of other cases besides.
Or consider the idea of reason-giving. It is true that the numerous parts
of the law do not require legal decision-makers to give reasons. Juries are not
compelled to give reasons for their decisions,
. •75 and the Supreme Court rarely provides reasons for its denials of certiorari.
Yet despite such examples, reasongiving is a pervasive and frequently praised feature of legal decision-making,
and a legal decision-maker who provides reasons for her decisions is considered
a better legal decision-maker than one who does not, 7 6 just as the better lawyer
or better judge is the one who provides reasons rather than assertions or emo7
tional appeals. To put it different, reason-giving is centrally about reasoning. 7
Reason-giving too, however, is a form of generalization. To provide a
reason for a decision is to provide the contours of the category that the particular
decision is a member of, as when we say that this particular cotton dealer does
not have to pay for this particular shipment
of cotton arriving on this particular
• 78
ship because there was a mutual mistake - because the transaction between the
dealer and the shipping agent fell within the larger category of transactions in
which the parties have different conceptions of the underlying factual basis of
the transaction. To give a reason for a decision is to place an argument within a
category, and reason-giving is thus, as with decision-making by rule and decision making according to precedent, a process of engaging in decision-making
by generalization, a connection that becomes even more apparent once we recognize that the commonly lauded practice of "principled adjudication" is at its
core the willingness of a court to follow in future cases, and thus to generalize,
the reasons it has given in a previous case.79
Consider in this regard the typical goal of the traditional (or at least the
ideal type) Socratic interrogation of a first-year American law student. After
See generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 1 (1931); A.L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,
74

22 MOD. L. REv. 117 (1959).
75

See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons,47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 634 (1995).

76

See Paul R. Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. &

MARY L. REv. 685, 701-05 (1986).
See generally Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 531, 536-37 (1996).
77

78

Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).

79
See generally M.P. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 35 (1963); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance ofNeutral Principles,78
COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978).
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having been dragged through the recitation of the facts of the case in which
some penniless widow has been unable to recover against a wealthy but nonnegligent corporation, the student is asked whether the result was correct. "No,"
the student announces, making clear that he thinks that this widow ought to be
able to recover against this corporation in these circumstances. But then the
professor, assisted more by having conducted the same interrogation on the
same facts in the same case for the past forty-seven years than by any great insight, offers a series of hypotheticals, all designed to demonstrate to the rest of
the class at this student's expense that any legal rule allowing this widow to
recover against this corporation would entail much worse results in other cases
and would thus be bad policy. The goal of the Socratic interrogation, therefore,
is to help (or force) the students to understand that morally relevant features are
not necessarily legally relevant, and thus that legal reasoning involves grouping
together morally, politically, socially, and possibly economically different
events under the same legal heading. At least in its traditional guise, the Socratic examination is designed to involve training in generalization.
Some of the good features of Socratic examination have gone by the
wayside as its numerous bad features - professional bullying, most notably have become largely and deservedly unacceptable. But it is important not to
lose the sense of the goal of the Socratic examination, and in an important way
the goal of legal training. The Socratic examination was located and to some
extent is still located at the intersection of thinking about rules, thinking about
precedent, and thinking about reason-giving. At this intersection lies the idea of
generality and generalization, and if we think that rules, precedent, and reasongiving are important to law then we have to think that generality is important to
law as well.
Unlike particularity, however, generality is not just important to law in
the same way it is important to medicine, psychology, social work, architecture,
and criminal investigation. All of these endeavors use rules, but they use them
less, they use them less strongly, and they do not train their practitioners in the
use of rules as such, even if they may at times train their practitioners to use
particular rules. So too with reason-giving. All sorts of professions and human
activities require the giving of reasons, but none obsess about it the way law
does, and few - philosophy may be an exception - consider reason-giving a
central feature of the enterprise.
The point is even more extreme when we turn to the idea of precedent.
In the case of precedent, what the law often lauds is scorned in other areas. Philosophers treat an argument from precedent as essentially a fallacy, and in the
world of public policy the idea of precedent drops out almost entirely. That
George W. Bush should do something because Bill Clinton did it is, except in
very rare circumstances, simply not a credible argument at all. In the world of
policy and politics the practitioners are expected to make the correct decision on
this occasion, and the idea that one would make an incorrect decision on this
occasion because a similar incorrect decision was made in the past is not an idea
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that has much purchase in the world of public affairs, let alone in the world of
medicine, social work, architecture, psychology, or criminal investigation.
In law, it thus seems, generality has a disproportionate presence, but
particularity has only a proportionate presence. If this is right, and I put it in the
subjunctive only to stress that this is in the final analysis an empirical claim that
I cannot test rigorously in this context, then we may in the idea of generality
have located what is, although hardly unique to law and although hardly absent
outside of law, a form of thinking that would undergird law's claim to be different, and our hypothetical law school dean's claim that there is something to the
idea of legal reasoning, and something to the idea of thinking like a lawyer.
V. CONCLUSION: THE STABILITY OF LAW

My goal here has not been to justify the distinctiveness of law but only
to locate it. Like anchovies, which do exist even though I find them distasteful,
the ability to identify something is not to endorse it. Still, it may be worth closing with a few observations about the values that may underlie law's obsession
with generality.
First, generality may be the vehicle of stability. By treating unalike
cases alike, law, and not just in the areas of precedent, embodies Justice
Brandeis's conclusion that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."80 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brandeis recognized that the particular mission of law may be
that of achieving certainty for certainty's sake, consistency for consistency's
sake, and stability for stability's sake. These are hardly the only goals of any
system of social organization, and often it is more important to be right than to
be consistent, more important to be flexible than to be stable, and more important to be wise than to be certain. Yet any complex social structure will engage
in substantial separation of powers, in the non-technical sense of that term, and
will recognize the virtues of functional division of responsibilities. When this is
so, it may well be that some institutions are more likely to be the vehicles of
change and other more likely the vehicles of stability, and thus it may well be
that law is best understood as having the particular vocation of stability while it
leaves to other institutions the vocation of change.
This idea of stability as the particular mission of the law relates closely
to the second argument for seeing law, normatively as well as descriptively,
through the lens of generality. When the "rule of law" is contrasted with the
"rule of men," the core idea is that individual power, creativity, initiative, and
discretion have their dark side. The rule of men would be fine if all men were
good, but when many men are not so, and when a degree of risk-aversion is justified, we may often prefer to lose the most positive efforts of the best of men in

80

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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order to guard against the most negative efforts of the worst of them. 8 1 When
such a view of official power prevails, law looms large, and law may be the
institution charged with checking the worst of abuses even if in doing so it becomes less able to make the best of changes. Once again, therefore, the idea of
generality, putting official action in larger categories rather than relying on the
individual discretion of individual officials, links closely with that understanding of law that generations of rule of law rhetoric have attempted to capture.
Finally, generality relates closely to the idea of authority. Authority,
also the characteristic mode of the law, is once again about generalization,
because authority is about treating the emanations from certain sources - certain
courts, certain books, certain institutions - as being important just because of
their source. And if the source and not the content is to be important, then it
must be that the source itself is a generalization, and that the idea of authority is
at the very least a close cousin to the idea of generality.
As with precedent, authority is hardly a universal good. In many domains it is best to do what is right rather than what someone else thinks is right.
But if again in a complex world there is room for authority and authorities, then
the fact that authority is more important in law than elsewhere says a great deal
about the distinctiveness of legal reasoning, and the distinctiveness of the idea
of generality that undergirds authority itself.
Much of this may be depressing to those who see law in more idealistic
ways. If law is a vehicle of stability and not of change, of pessimism about human nature and not of optimism, of restraint and not of progress, and of the past
rather than the future, it may not be at all times and at all places the instrument
of social change. If law is a shield and not a sword, its power may be limited
even though its necessity is no less. Yet of course we know that law is often the
latter element of each of these pairs, and that it is often used for change, for progress, and to break down the encrustations of existing thought. When it does
this, however, it may do this not because it is being law-like, but precisely because it is not. Law as a system may often be an agent for particularistic creativity, but law as a mode of thinking may even more often be an agent for the
stability and consistency that only generality can bring.
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See generally Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653 (1991).
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See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORrrY OF LAW:
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(1979); Frederick Schauer, The Questions ofAuthority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95 (1992).
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